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JURISDICTION OVER APPEAL 
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-
3(2)0). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Did the district court error in deciding as a matter of law that Plaintiffs claims for 
unjust enrichment, conditional gift, promissory estoppel, reasonable reliance, and breach 
of contract are barred by Utah's abolishment of the cause of action for breach of a 
contract to marry? [Record ("R.") at 34-46, 88 (Hearing Transcript pp. 8-14)]. 
The district court's dismissal of Plaintiff s Complaint is reviewed by this Court for 
correctness and in reaching its decision this Court must accept the Complaint's factual 
allegations as true and draw all inference's in Plaintiffs favor. See Stokes v. Wagoner, 
1999 UT 94, t6, 987 P.2d 602. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This case arises from a failed engagement between Plaintiff Mr. Hess and 
Defendant Ms. Johnston. [R. at 2-6]. During the engagement period Mr. Hess incurred 
substantial expenses at Ms. Johnston's request and for her benefit, as well as, undergoing 
a vasectomy procedure. [R. at 2-6]. Following the termination of the engagement by 
Ms. Johnston, Mr. Hess filed a Complaint on November 5, 2005 in which Mr. Hess 
sought to recover half of the major costs incurred by Mr. Hess and for Ms. Johnston to 
pay for the cost of the reversal of Mr. Hess' vasectomy procedure. [R. at 1-9]. Mr. Hess' 
Complaint asserted claims for unjust enrichment, conditional gift, promissory estoppel, 
reasonable reliance, and breach of contract. [R. at 6-9]. 
On January 9, 2006, Defendant filed her Motion for Sanctions and Motion for 
Dismissal with Prejudice along with supporting memoranda. [R. at 15-32]. Defendant's 
motions essentially asserted that Mr. Hess' claims were barred by the Utah Supreme 
Court's decision in Jackson v. Brown, 904 P.2d 685 (Utah 1995), which held that Utah's 
cause of action for breach of an agreement to marry was abolished. [R. at 15-32]. 
Plaintiff filed a memorandum in opposition to Plaintiffs motions on January 27, 2006, 
and Defendant filed a reply memorandum on February 9, 2006. [R. at 34-54]. Following 
briefing, a hearing was held before the Honorable Dennis J. Frederick on April 10, 2006. 
[R. at 58, 88]. By its April 11, 2006 Minute Entry, the trial court issued its decision 
granting Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, but denying Defendant's Motion for Sanctions. 
[R. at 61-63]. The trial court signed a Final Order Dismissing Action with Prejudice on 
April 25, 2006. [R. at 64-65]. 
Plaintiff filed his Notice of Appeal of the Final Order Dismissing Action with 
Prejudice on May 25, 2006. [R. at 70-71]. Defendant filed her Notice of Cross-Appeal 
on May 31, 2006, by which Defendant seeks a reversal of the trial court's denial of 
Defendant's Motion for Sanctions. [R. at 72]. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Mr. Hess is forty-four years old and has been married twice; the first time 
for three years and the second time for eight years. Mr. Hess has been single for 
approximately the past three years. Ms. Johnston is forty-seven years old and was 
married once before for approximately twenty years. [R. at 2, Tflf 5-7]. 
2. Both Mr. Hess and Ms. Johnston work for Jacobsen Construction. Mr. 
Hess and Ms. Johnston started dating in mid-April, 2004. Although Mr. Hess initially 
approached Ms. Johnston, ultimately Ms. Johnston pursued the relationship with Mr. 
Hess. [R. at 2, ffl[8-10]. 
3. Near the end of May 2004, over Memorial Day weekend, Ms. Johnston 
professed her love for Mr. Hess and their relationship became much more serious. In late 
June and early July 2004, Mr. Hess and Ms. Johnston began living with each other on 
weekends. [R. at 2, fflf 11-12]. 
4. In July 2004 Mr. Hess and Ms. Johnston began serious discussions about 
getting married, and decided that they would get married, but would take their time in 
scheduling the wedding and make sure that their finances were in order before getting 
married. They initially planned on a wedding sometime in November 2004. [R. at 2, fflf 
13-14]. 
5. In early July 2004, they began looking at engagement rings. They went to 
O.C. Tanner, and she selected the engagement ring of her choice. Thereafter, they 
located a jeweler who could make the same ring for $12,000, which was lower than the 
sale price for the ring at O.C. Tanner of $30,000. Mr. Hess made a down payment on the 
ring by selling jewelry he owned to the jeweler for $3,500. [R. at 2-3, ffl[ 15-19]. 
6. Ms. Johnston told Mr. Hess that she wanted to go on certain trips prior to 
getting married. In July of 2004, at the request of Ms. Johnston and in furtherance of 
their agreement to get married, Mr. Hess and Ms. Johnston went on a seven-day cruise to 
Alaska. The seven-day Alaskan cruise cost $7,800, which was paid for by Mr. Hess on 
his credit cards. [R. at 3, ffij 20-21]. 
7. After the Alaskan cruise, Ms. Johnston insisted that Mr. Hess meet with 
each of her children and personally request their permission to marry Ms. Johnston. Mr. 
Hess made those visits, including a trip to California to visit with one of her children, and 
obtained permission from each of the children as requested. [R. at 3, ff 22-23]. 
8. In September of 2004, at Ms. Johnston's insistence, Mr. Hess and Ms. 
Johnston went on a three-week trip to France. Ms. Johnston had lived in France several 
years before and wanted to return to France with Mr. Hess to introduce him to her friends 
there prior to their marriage. The trip to France cost approximately $17,700, which was 
paid for by Mr. Hess on his credit cards. [R. at 3, fflf 24-26]. 
9. Ms. Johnston requested that Mr. Hess pay for both the Alaskan cruise and 
the trip to France. [R. at 3, f 27]. 
10. The day before they left on their trip to France, Mr. Hess picked up the 
custom-made engagement ring and paid off the remaining balance due of $8,500 on the 
ring. While in France, Mr. Hess formally proposed to Ms. Johnston. Ms. Johnston 
accepted Mr. Hess' proposal, and Mr. Hess gave Ms. Johnston the engagement ring. [R. 
at 4, ^1128-30]. 
11. Following the trip to France, Ms. Johnston and Mr. Hess continued to live 
together, with Mr. Hess staying at Ms. Johnston's house the majority of the time on 
weekends. Occasionally Ms. Johnston would stay at Mr. Hess' house. [R. at 4, fflj 31-
32]. 
12. At some time in or about July 2004, Ms. Johnston underwent a medical 
procedure that would prevent her from getting pregnant. However, since there was still a 
possibility that Ms. Johnston could become pregnant, she insisted that Mr. Hess get a 
Vasectomy. [R. at 4, fflj 33-34]. 
13. In August 2004, prior to the trip to France, Mr. Hess complied with Ms. 
Johnston's request and underwent the Vasectomy procedure. Ms. Johnston herself 
attended the Vasectomy procedure. The doctor in charge of the procedure allowed Ms. 
Johnston, at her request, to participate in the Vasectomy procedure by personally cutting 
the vas deferens. [R. at 4,ffi[ 35-37]. 
14. The Vasectomy procedure caused Mr. Hess considerable pain, which 
persists to this day. Mr. Hess is in the process of finding a qualified doctor to reverse the 
Vasectomy, but he has no guarantee that a reversal will be successful. However, Mr. 
Hess' insurance will not cover the cost of the surgical procedure to reverse the 
Vasectomy. [R. at 4-5, fflj 38-40]. 
15. Mr. Hess would not have had the Vasectomy but for Ms. Johnston's 
promise to marry him and her request that he undergo the procedure. Mr. Hess relied 
upon Ms. Johnston's promise to marry him in giving up the opportunity to have children. 
[R. at 5,141]. 
16. Sometime in October or November 2004, Ms. Johnston requested that Mr. 
Hess help purchase a vehicle for her son. Because Mr. Hess knew that he and Ms. 
Johnston would be getting married and Ms. Johnston's son would soon be his step-son, 
Mr. Hess agreed to help pay for a used truck. Mr. Hess gave $2,400 to Ms. Johnston, 
which she used to purchase a used truck for Ms. Johnston's son. [R. at 5, ff 42-44]. 
17. During the latter part of 2004, Ms. Johnston and Mr. Hess decided that they 
should move the wedding date from November 2004 to May 5, 2005, which date was 
later changed to July 9, 2005 to accommodate their schedules. [R. at 5,f45]. 
18. In late April 2005, without any forewarning or explanation, Ms. Johnson 
broke off the engagement with Mr. Hess. That is, on April 23, 2005, Ms. Johnston 
informed Mr. Hess that she would not be his wife, and terminated the engagement. [R. at 
5,146]. 
19. Mr. Hess was shocked and completely surprised by Ms. Johnston's 
termination of their engagement. Despite Mr. Hess' numerous requests for an 
explanation, Ms. Johnston has been unwilling to offer any meaningful explanation of her 
reasons for breaking off the engagement. [R. at 5, ff 47-48]. 
20. If Mr. Hess had known that Ms. Johnston did not with to marry him, he 
would not have incurred the expenses of the Alaskan cruise, the trip to France, the 
vasectomy requested by Ms. Johnston, the purchase of the engagement ring, and 
providing money to Ms. Johnston for her purchase of a vehicle for Ms. Johnston's son. 
[R. at 6,1f 49]. 
21. Mr. Hess has tried unsuccessfiilly to sell the custom-made engagement ring. 
[R. at 6 ^ 50]. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The trial court erred in deciding that Mr. Hess' claims were barred by the Utah 
Supreme Court's decision in Jackson in which the court abolished the cause of action for 
breach of promise to marry. The holding in Jackson is narrow and does not operate to 
abolish all claims that may arise from a failed engagement as it was so interpreted by the 
trial court. The Utah Supreme Court in Jackson expressly recognized that no injury to a 
plaintiff would go unremedied and no fundamental remedy would be lost by its 
abolishment of the breach of contract to marry cause of action. Accordingly, Mr. Hess' 
claims should not have been dismissed on the basis of Jackson's abolishment of the 
breach of contract to marry cause of action. 
Furthermore, if the Jackson decision does not bar Mr. Hess' claims, Ms. 
Johnston's assertion that the claims fail to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, 
should be rejected by this Court. Accepting the facts alleged by Mr. Hess as true, Mr. 
Hess' Complaint states claims upon which relief can be granted and Mr. Hess should be 
allowed to proceed with his claims against Ms. Johnston. 
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ARGUMENT 
L UTAH'S ABOLISHMENT OF THE CAUSE OF ACTION FOR BREACH 
OF PROMISE TO MARRY DOES NOT BAR MR. HESS5 CLAIMS FOR 
RESTITUTION OF EXPENSES INCURRED OR TO BE INCURRED. 
The trial court erred in holding that the abolishment of the cause of action for 
breach of a promise to marry by the Utah Supreme Court in Jackson v. Brown, 904 P.2d 
685 (Utah 1995), bars Mr. Hess' claims for restitution of the expenses and losses he has 
incurred or will incur as a result of his courtship of Ms. Johnston. In Utah, prior to the 
Jackson case, a cause of action existed for breach of a promise to marry, which allowed a 
plaintiff to "recover such amounts as will compensate [plaintiff] for the benefits lost or 
detriments suffered because of the breach, and the distress, mortification, mental 
suffering, and injury to [plaintiffs] affections which she has undergone in consequence 
thereof" Arbon v. Blyth. 179 P. 979, 979 (Utah 1919) (rejecting challenge to jury 
instruction describing the damages plaintiff was entitled to if the jury found that the 
defendant had breach his promise to marry). Furthermore, under the breach of promise to 
marry cause of action the successful plaintiff was "entitled to such a sum as would place 
[plaintiff] in as good a position presumably as [plaintiff] would have been in" had 
plaintiff married. Id at 979-80. It is that cause of action that the Court in Jackson 
understandably rejected as being outdated, contrary to public policy and not the proper 
vehicle to redress emotional loss. Jackson, 904 P.2d at 687. 
The Court in Jackson, however, did not abolish all possible causes of actions 
arising from a cancelled engagement. In fact, the Court in Jackson expressly stated that, 
despite abolishing the breach of promise to marry cause of action, uno injury to a 
plaintiff, upon proper showing, goes unremedied" and that "no fundamental remedy is 
lost to this or any other plaintiff by our decision that breach of a promise to marry no 
longer exists." Id. at 687 (emphasis added). Justice Durham's statement that "any losses 
suffered because of [plaintiff s] reasonable reliance upon [defendant's] promise to marry 
her (such as normal expenses attendant to a wedding) may be recoverable under a theory 
of reasonable reliance or breach of contract," simply suggests the types of causes of 
action that remain viable. Id. at 687. Associate Chief Justice Stewart's concurring 
opinion only objects to that last sentence of Justice Durham's opinion by stating that the 
"issue should be addressed, in my view, only when it is properly presented to this Court 
and properly argued by the parties." Id. at 688 (A.C.J. Stewart concurring). Justice 
Stewart does not reject Justice Durham's statement, but simply would leave the issue to 
be decided "when it is properly presented to this Court." Id. 
Significantly, the court in Jackson affirmed the lower court's refusal to dismiss the 
plaintiffs intentional infliction of emotional distress cause of action, which arose from 
the defendant's cancellation of their engagement. Id at 687-88. In doing so, the Jackson 
court expressly rejected the very argument made by Ms. Johnston in her Motion to 
Dismiss: 
[Defendant] argues that because [plaintiffs] claim of intentional infliction 
of emotional distress is based upon the same alleged acts as her claim of 
breach of promise to marry, "as one fails, so must the other." We disagree. 
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Id at 688 (emphasis added); see also Piccininni v. Hajus, 429 A.2d 886, 889-90 (Conn. 
1980) (holding that the Connecticut statute prohibiting breach of promise to marry action 
did not prohibit action for restitution of specific property or money transferred in reliance 
on various false and fraudulent representation). By allowing the Plaintiff to proceed with 
its intentional infliction of emotional distress case, the Jackson court, contrary to the trial 
court's interpretation, was not limiting recovery to only causes of action for intentional 
infliction of emotional distress or fraud. The Piccininni court wisely recognized that "[a] 
proceeding may still be maintained which although occasioned by a breach of contract to 
marry, and in a sense based upon the breach, is not brought to recover for the breach 
itself." 429 A.2d at 889. 
Mr. Hess is not trying to get around the abolishment of the breach of promise to 
marry cause of action by seeking the same results under a different a name. Courts in 
other jurisdictions have recognized that the type of relief that Mr. Hess is seeking is 
separate and distinct from a breach of promise to marry cause of action. See, e.g., 
Fanning v. Iversea 535 N.W.2d 770, 773-774 (S.D. 1995) (affirming trial court's holding 
that plaintiffs action to quiet title and for return of loaned money under theory of 
conditional gifts was not barred by statute that prohibited breach of promise to marry 
cause of action); Wilson v. Dabo, 461 N.E.2d 8, 9 (Ohio Ct. App. 1983) (holding that 
plaintiffs claim for unjust enrichment seeking the return of property and money was not 
barred by Ohio's statute prohibiting breach of promise to marry claims). As the court in 
Fanning stated: 
There exists a distinction, however, between such "heart-balm" actions and 
recovery of conditional gifts. . . . [Plaintiff] is not asking for damages for 
loss of marriage, or humiliation. Rather, he seeks to assert his equitable 
common-law right to recover property for which he paid and solely owns 
because the condition precedent to him gifting an interest to [defendant] 
was not fulfilled. 
535 N.W.2d at 774. Likewise, the court in Piccininni stated: 
The predominant view is that Heart Balm statutes should be applied no 
further than to bar actions for damages suffered from loss of marriage, 
humiliation, and other direct consequences of the breach, and should not 
affect the rights and duties determinable by common law principles. 
Piccininni, 429 A.2d at 888. Accordingly, this Court should hold that Utah's abolishment 
of the cause of action for breach of promise to marry does not preclude the causes of 
action asserted by Mr. Hess. 
IL MR. HESS HAS ALLEGED FACTS UPON WHICH RELIEF CAN BE 
GRANTED UNDER THE CAUSES OF ACTION ASSERTED. 
Accepting the allegations of Mr. Hess' Complaint as true, as must be done at this 
point, Mr. Hess has stated claims upon which relief can be granted. Mr. Hess first cause 
of action is for unjust enrichment, which requires that "(1) the defendant receive a 
benefit; (2) an appreciation or knowledge by the defendant of the benefit; and (3) under 
circumstances that would make it unjust for the defendant to retain the benefit without 
paying for i t" Davies v. Olsoa 746 P.2d 264, 269 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). Here, as 
alleged in the Complaint, Ms. Johnston received the benefit of the trips to Alaska and 
France paid for by Mr. Hess, as well as, the money that Mr. Hess provided to Ms. 
Johnston to help her purchase a truck for her son. Given the obvious cost of the benefits 
received, it can't be disputed that Ms. Johnston had an appreciation or knowledge of the 
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benefit bestowed upon her by Mr. Hess. Finally, the facts of this case support a finding 
that by refusing to compensate Mr. Hess for her share of the expenses for the trips and the 
money provided for her son's truck, Ms. Johnston has unjustly retained those benefits. 
Accordingly, Mr. Hess should be entitled to recover from Ms. Johnston her share of the 
trip costs, the money provided to her for her son's car, and the cost of the procedure to 
reverse the vasectomy. 
Mr. Hess second cause of action is for return of conditional gifts bestowed upon 
Ms. Johnston, which included the cost of taking her on the trips she requested they take 
and the money given to Ms. Johnston to help her pay for her son's car. It is well 
recognized that gifts given during the engagement period of a relationship are generally 
considered to be conditional. See, e.g., McLain v. Gilliam, 389 S.W.2d 131, 131-32 
(Tex. Civ. App. 1965) (holding that plaintiffs gift of $4,200 during engagement to help 
defendant pay debts was conditional and can be recovered by plaintiff upon termination 
of engagement); Fanning, 535 N.W.2d at 773-74 ("The majority rule is that a gift made in 
contemplation of marriage is conditional and should be returned if that condition is not 
fulfilled"); Picininnl 429 A.2d at 888 ("[T]he majority rule appears to be that a gift made 
in contemplation of marriage is conditional upon a subsequent ceremonial marriage... 
."). Furthermore, a conditional gift is not limited to an engagement ring or other presents, 
but also includes such things as gifts of money to help for financial obligations or for 
gifts of an ownership in property. See McLain, 389 S.W.2d at 131-32; Fanning, 535 
N.W.2dat774. 
The third cause of action raised in Mr. Hess' Complaint is for promissory estoppel 
or reasonable reliance. The necessary elements of a promissory estoppel claim are: "(1) a 
promise reasonably expected to induce reliance; (2) reasonable reliance inducing action 
or forbearance on the part of the promise or a third person; and (3) detriment to the 
promisee or third person." Weese v. Davis County Comm'n, 834 P.2d 1, 4 n. 17 (Utah 
1992). Here, Mr. Hess and Ms. Johnston had agreed to get married and in reliance on 
that promise, Mr. Hess incurred a number of expenses, including paying for two trips, 
loaning money for a car purchase, and purchasing an expensive engagement ring, and 
underwent a surgical procedure, none of which he would have done had they not agreed 
to get married. Mr. Hess is entitled to be reimbursed for Ms. Johnston's share of those 
expenses, the loss in value of the ring, and the cost of reversing the vasectomy. The fact 
that Mr. Hess received some benefit from the expenses incurred in reliance on the 
promise, as asserted by Defendants, does not prohibit Mr. Hess' recovery. See 
Andreason v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 848 P.2d 171, 174-75 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) 
(upholding award of promissory estoppel damages despite benefit received by plaintiff 
due to the equitable nature of promissory estoppel). 
Mr. Hess' fourth cause of action is a relatively straightforward claim for breach of 
an agreement by which Mr. Hess seeks to be restored as nearly as possible to his original 
position prior to Ms. Johnston's breach of the agreement. As set forth above, Mr. Hess 
seeks to be restored to his financial position prior to the engagement, which includes 
having Ms. Johnston pay for the reversal of his vasectomy, to be compensated for the loss 
u 
of value of the engagement ring, which Mr. Hess will most likely have to sell at a price 
significantly lower than its approximately $12,000 purchase price, to be compensated for 
half the cost of the trips, and to have the money he gave to Ms. Johnston for her son's 
truck returned. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should reverse the lower Court's granting of 
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss and remand the case for further proceedings. 
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Case No. 050919801 
Hon. J. DENNIS FREDERICK 
April 11, 2006 
The above-entitled matter comes before the Court pursuant to 
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss with Prejudice and for Sanctions. 
The Court heard oral argument with respect to the motion on April 
10, 2006. Following the hearing, the matter was taken under 
advisement. 
The Court having considered the motion and memoranda and for 
the good cause shown, hereby enters the following ruling. 
In Jackson v. Brown, 904 P.2d 685 (Utah 1995), the Utah 
Supreme Court stated the following: 
[W]e see no benefit in discouraging or 
penalizing persons who realize, before making 
these vows, that for whatever reason, they 
are unprepared to take such an important 
step. Plaintiff in this case concedes that if 
we were to uphold the action, any time an 
engaged party were to cancel wedding plans 
for any reason, the other party would have a 
prima facie case for breach of promise to 
marry. Such an action would be highly 
susceptible to abuse by persons whose 
feelings are damaged by a former fiancee's 
decision to cancel a wedding. In Norton, we 
held that actions so manipulable and 
vulnerable to this type of abuse are 
"counterproductive" to the good of the state. 
An action which would accrue any time a 
person, for whatever reason, cancels or 
indefinitely postpones wedding plans is 
contrary to the public policy of this state. 
Not only would such an action be readily 
amenable to abuse, but it would discourage 
individuals with legitimate doubts or 
concerns about a planned wedding from 
cancelling the event. Encouraging people to 
marry out of fear of a lawsuit furthers no 
legitimate purpose and would undoubtedly 
cause many problems. 
Id. at 687. (Internal citations omitted). 
In the instant, Plaintiff has made no allegations of 
intentional infliction of emotional distress or fraud and 
although he has attempted to plead around Jackson, when the 
subject matter of the pleadings is considered1, it is clear 
Plaintiff's Complaint is based upon or arises out of a breach of 
a contract to marry-a cause of action which has been expressly 
abolished in Utah. 
In light of the forgoing, Defendant's Motion to Dismiss with 
Prejudice is granted. With respect to sanctions, the Court is 
not persuaded Plaintiff's claims were brought frivolously, 
consequently, Defendant's request for sanctions of costs, fees 
and expenses is, respectfully, denied. 
DATED this /(V /day of April, 2006. 
'Construed in the light most favorable to Plaintiff and 
indulging all reasonable inferences therefrom, as required when 
ruling on a motion to dismiss. Mounteer v. Utah Power & Light 
Co. 823 P.2d 1055 {Utah 1991). 
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